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Alexander Podoprigora: “Chelyabinsk will have a new mayor. Political analyst Alexander Podoprigora talks about when and why the power in the Chelyabinsk region will change. Designer Artemy Lebedev launched a video blog on YouTube

Alexander Vasilyevich, is there life after the last elections, or is everything just beginning?

The elections passed - this is the ritual that had to be observed in order to formalize and legitimize the new head of the region, and now they should be forgotten as a bad dream and work further. Everyone understands perfectly well that “this” elections could only be called very tentatively - rather, an artificial political technological construction, when the main contender for the post of governor had no competitors and the main problem was to drag the people to the polling stations at any cost in the absence of intrigue and competition. So there is nothing to brag about and it's time to end “rewarding the innocent and punishing the innocent,” as we usually do.

But in the end this problem was solved?

Yes thank God. Although, as far as I know, in many respects it was resolved in the interval from 3 pm to 8 pm on election day (when the main stream of voters passed, and the turnout in Chelyabinsk was less than 20%) by the selfless work of election commissions and district administrations, which were "on their ears." and diligently, let's say, cleaned the voter lists ... There were, of course, the initial flaws of the electoral commission - there were many cases of being on the voter lists who no longer live at these addresses, rent apartments, or simply left, died, went to the army etc. By the way, the districts of the Chelyabinsk new buildings seriously suffered in this regard - Parkovy, Churilovo, Poplar Alley and so on ... All this had to be done, of course, long before the elections, but the authorities themselves believed in their own publications that everything is fine and people eager to vote for Dubrovsky ...

Were you surprised by more than 86 percent of the votes for Dubrovsky?

No, not at all. In such "referendum type" elections, the fewer people come, the greater the percentage of votes the winner gets, that is, in our case, Dubrovsky. If the turnout were 20 percent, then all 95 percent would vote for him. But the result of such a plan would be to some extent even shameful for the authorities.

Because the level of turnout is a question of the real legitimation of the winner?

And so too. But this is not even a question of political technologies, but of politics itself. Let me explain now. In my blog I cited the example of Trekhgorny, where at the same time there was a real struggle in the competitive elections of the head of the city and where the United Russia party found itself in opposition to the current head of the city of Olkhovskaya. And it turned out that more than 60 percent of voters came to the polls. At the same time, almost 90 percent voted for Dubrovsky, and the representative of PSZ and "United Russia" Sychev won with a score of 67 percent against seven for the current head.

Is that possible?

Quite. Local elites, starting with the leadership of the Instrument-Making Plant, were opposed to Svetlana Olkhovskaya, believing that she was ineffective in managing the city economy, and did not take into account a number of opportunities that the city had, it fell into desolation, began to "sink". Even the ex-mayor of the city of Lubenets, who at one time himself nominated Olkhovskaya, spoke out against her.

But, on the other hand, even considering that these are, in general, local squabbles, it should be noted that this became possible due to the mistakes of the regional authorities. It was they who first put pressure on Olkhovskaya for a long time, insisting that direct elections of the mayor be eliminated in the city. But people want to elect their own head! Olkhovskaya led the "protest movement" for direct elections and lost them deafeningly.

As a result, we have a paradox: "United Russia" scored a 100% result (21 out of 21 candidates, a new mayor) exactly where, contrary to the wishes of the party, open, competitive and fair elections were held! And where everyone was "crushed" - the result was scraped up somehow.

The question arises: why is this party so afraid that everywhere, where possible, it is pushing for the abolition of direct elections? Experience shows that United Russia is able to win confidently and cleanly under normal competition. Agree, the difference in turnout is still indicative: an honest 60 percent in Trekhgorny versus a strained 35 percent in Chelyabinsk. And 90 of these 60 percent are for Dubrovsky. I am sure that the competitive and fair elections of the "party of power" today only play into the hands: they make its position truly legitimate, people know that they themselves, personally cast their votes. It just requires real and thorough political work in every city, and there is apparently no readiness for this yet. So far, the habit of throwing stupid leaflets on the people and the heads of the territories with compromising evidence and criminal cases prevails. It is futile in the new conditions.

And what is the party in power afraid of, in your opinion?

Many of our "political leaders" have long and habitually been most afraid of the fact that Moscow will not approve of some result of their work or will not notice their zeal. And therefore they prefer to act “for sure”, as in the old days they acted, “showing the result”. They don't know any other way.

This is connected, of course, not with substantive political issues, but with the need of specific personalities to "prove themselves", to show that here, we are a testing ground, an experimental city, and we, local politicians, are the coolest. And then they should be noticed and rewarded with a carrot or a career. It's simple.

Is the LSG reform from the same line?

- I think yes. Here, in our regional media, deputies, in particular, Messrs. Bodrov and Mitelman, appear in chorus (apparently with the suggestion of regional political curators), who assure us that everything is just fine with the LSG reform. True, they are confused in the testimony, not really knowing how many powers will be given to the districts, not which ones, not actually the powers that already exist at this level. And no one knows exactly how the districts will be financed, when the amendments to the Budgetary and Tax codes etc. They cannot answer a simple question: what did these reforms give as a result? However, there is no answer to this. That is why, as far as I know, after the liquidation of the Ministry of Regional Development and the "Chelyabinsk experience", questions with agglomerations and local self-government federal level closed. Everything will be transferred to regional level: "You need - you and do it." That is, there will be no funding, and the “initiators of the reform” will make problems for themselves.

Indeed, when Semyon Arkadyevich Mitelman speaks about “the power that has approached the people” ... You know, looking at the Kurchatovsky district of Chelyabinsk, where Messrs. Mitelman have been more than close to the people for ten years -father, and there are many assistants in the territories, and there are excellent relations with the district administration), a simple question arises: what has prevented you from successfully solving the problems of residents of your constituencies? What, by all means, you need 25 more deputies (for the most part, the same own assistants or business partners)? Well, let's elect a deputy in every house that this power was very close ... It's just a profanation of political work - the question is not how many deputies we will divorce, but what these deputies will be able to do. Otherwise, the closer this ineffective and corrupted government becomes to the people, the faster they will reach it one fine moment ...

"Sandakov knows no more than he is supposed to"

And what about the Head of Chelyabinsk and the city manager of the regional center? This was, in fact, the only intrigue of the entire political season. For some things - at least because the announcements of events with the participation of Sergei Davydov are disseminated in the media through the governor's press service - the conclusion suggests itself that the city manager seems to remain the same.

I'm not so sure about this, I have completely different information. As far as I understand, the situation with the heads of Chelyabinsk is as secret as possible, and only a few people know the exact alignment, both for the mayors and for the future Government of the region - including the governor Boris Dubrovsky, the head of his administration Ivan Senichev and those with whom they are in this regard. negotiation.

Even the "political" vice-governor Nikolai Sandakov?

Everyone knows what he is supposed to know. Nikolai Dmitrievich has been reappointed to his post, he has his own "field" of work and sphere of authority - elections, work with the media, relations with political parties, public organizations, etc. I think that for Boris Dubrovsky it was a convenient personnel move. Perhaps because he himself does not like to engage in what is called or is now considered "politics". At the same time, realizing that he is still engaged in real politics himself. It's just that real, real politics for him are conversations with Viktor Filippovich [Rashnikov], with Alexander Mikhailovich [Aristov], and with a couple of other leading "siloviki". This is where politics is, where agreements are made and decisions are made. The rest is a matter of technology, and these technologies are given to Sandakov, who has shown himself to be a fairly competent operator of this market in its current state. Everything related to elections, media or political parties there - Dubrovsky categorically does not want to get into this, apparently, considering this a not very decent business for a good regional leader. This is not a tsar's business, the head of the region should not touch this, be dirty with it, give some obligations to people incomparable with him.

But about who should become the heads of Chelyabinsk - for Dubrovsky this is a very serious topic. I think that until recently there was a choice in the range between radical decisions - from the fact that Mosharov and Davydov remain together at least for a certain period (after all, you can always change the city manager, if the head of the region and the deputies so desire), before replacing both heads, with a representative of the Magnitogorsk team as a city manager (Senichev or Teftelev), and Baryshev as the head of Chelyabinsk.

Now, according to my information, the issue has been resolved. Davydov leaves, and his place is taken by a representative of the "Magnitogorsk team" - the greatest chances for Ivan Senichev. But the fact that it will not be a Chelyabinsk resident is absolutely certain. He will be "balanced" by the Chelyabinsk resident Mosharov - after all, the elected (well, at least this way) mayor of the city is he, so the polity is observed. And a city manager is a hired specialist, even if you bring him from London, if he is effective. But he will not come from London, he will be "on his board."

Chelyabinsk, whatever one may say, for any governor is a key city, the capital of the region, a focus of electoral and other resources. Ahead is a series of serious election campaigns - elections to the Legislative Assembly, to the State Duma, and there are not far from the presidential elections. Moreover, I have heard from more than one source that the next mayor of Chelyabinsk will again be popularly elected. And the “governor's man”, who has increased his political weight and popularity, should go to the elections - and not the representative of the team of the ex-governor Yurevich, who has not shown himself in any way here. Except for a whole series of high-profile scandals, of course.

And what is bad about Davydov? He seems to be comfortable with financial and industrial groups, he is negotiable, he rebuilds to the necessary topics instantly, executive ...

- Yes, it suits many. How would any person who has been in this place for many years and managed to get to know everyone, to agree. But, as far as I understand, minimizing his chances of continuing his current work is based, among other things, on a sober assessment of the results of the elections in Chelyabinsk.

On the one hand, Davydov was never a favorite with Dubrovsky, on the other hand, he did not cause frank allergies. But now, after the elections (and, I think, Dubrovsky owns more, let's say, verified data than those discussed in the media), it turned out that, in general, there are no decisive arguments in favor of Davydov's reappointment. He does not control the electoral and political situation to such an extent that this is the main argument for his preservation, he is not the leader of the Chelyabinsk people, they are simply accustomed to him. They will also get used to something else - new, imposing and charming. They will quickly get used to it.

At the same time, we all remember well the numerous political and other flaws of Sergei Viktorovich. If you remember the history of his reign, then what immediately comes to mind, how was it remembered? Relocation of bus stations, plans for felling the pine forest, ugly sawing down trees in the streets, "road revolution", construction at the "Izumrudny" quarry, a barrier on Tatyanicheva street, and so on. He will be remembered for these things.

But to say that under Davydov Chelyabinsk made some kind of qualitative leap forward, changed outwardly, or that the quality of life of Chelyabinsk residents and their habitat has grown so much that the townspeople are downright in love with their mayor (which happens in some places) - this is unlikely.

Leave Chelyabinsk in these hands for years to come? Dubrovsky does not have a single argument for such a decision. And now they will definitely not ask for Davydov from Moscow.

"And which of the" barons "of Chelyabinsk was cheated?"

One of the central themes of real urban policy was to be the relationship between the new regional leadership and the Chelyabinsk “district barons” - the conventional Baryshev, Ovchinnikov, Rylskikh, Vidgof, and so on. Many even believed that this would become a new point of some kind of confrontation ...

There is hysteria in the media about this, and a lot. But it rather resembles not the most clever invitation to bargaining, rather than the announcement of decisions that have not yet taken place. It's just that some are invited to the auction, and the auction is conducted in other places, and their results ... Let's see, in a word.

Boris Vidgof, as far as I understand, will be more than good. The problems there were announced when, in November last year, the head of the Traktorozavodsky District Administration Gorbunov brought to a meeting with the participation of Vice Governor Sandakov and Chairman of the Regional Executive Committee of United Russia Motovilov a list of potential candidates for City Duma deputies from the United Russia District, approved by the local Board of Directors (most of them became deputies on September 14). The "political leaders" had different surnames - the activists of the "Young Guard", in particular. And references to the authority of Governor Yurevich are the main argument. Then there were more. All this information - including how the not-so-bad head of the Traktorozavodsky district Gorbunov was squeezed out of his post - is in everyone's mind, people have seen and heard everything. And how they pressured Mayor Davydov to remove Gorbunov - including.

And, by the way - taking Vidgof out of the brackets - and which of the, as you call them, "district barons" were cheated? Rather the opposite! Baryshev, Ovchinnikov, Rylskikh - all will be in the City Duma, as before, together with their supporters. And the fitness trainer (as they say) Vitaly Pavlovich Rylskikh will become the head of the district. Or the same Baryshev: what will he lose if he becomes the head of the commission for urban planning - the most "delicious" of what is in the City Duma?

Look, by the way, in which district the candidate for governor from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Konstantin Natsievsky was elected to the district council? According to Soviet. And he will pass to the City Duma as a member of the “district team”. And the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which is in, let's say, partner relations with some authoritative business communities, will not lose anything at the regional level (Natsievsky as a member of the ZSO will be replaced by one of the party members), and at the level of the City Duma will acquire an experienced person. And yet - Natsievsky has long been cooperating as an assistant with the deputy of the State Duma from Chelyabinsk Vadim Kumin, deputy chairman of the State Duma's commission on financial markets. It is not joke. These are groups of real influence. Those who remember at least something about these names from the mid-90s will understand me. Not to see these serious processes (I am not labeling them now as positive or negative - this is reality) and engage in all sorts of nonsense.

“District barons” are becoming a political force. (I’m not saying that this is bad - as a rule, these people have earned the right to respect and influence). They will soon be called differently, because they will become the spokesmen for the interests of real communities. And this will be a new political reality. It's just that society starts to look different. Those who do not notice it will lose.

Hammer and microscope

Meanwhile, literally in the very first days, Boris Dubrovsky reappointed a significant part of the future Government of the region and announced a return to the "one-headed" system executive power when the Governor personally heads the Cabinet of Ministers of the region ...

Much of this work is yet to come. But I would like to draw your attention to the following. A significant part of the ministers - education, health care, culture, including finance - were reappointed "in bulk". This, I think, is largely due to the priorities in the work that Boris Dubrovsky has chosen for himself.

The sphere of politics and political technology - they were given to Sandakov, also because these things are not so important and interesting for the governor. On the conditional "social sphere" there is another vice-governor - "his" Yevgeny Redin, from whom Irina Gekht was effectively and beautifully removed to the Federation Council - on the whole professional, smart and experienced, but due to the fact that she was engaged in the same subject, only caused conflicts. And in the Federation Council, she will be in her place. There was no place in the new design for Ivan Feklin either - but simply due to the fact that there is already Sergei Komyakov in the industry.

But as for the ministries of economic "profile" - there will be changes. Principled and slow. In many respects, precisely because the head of the region considers this area to be key for himself and for the region. It is not unreasonable considering what is happening in the country. That is why he will deal with all this in many respects personally, and above all - to rebuild the structure of powers that has taken shape today, and which seems to him ineffective. Personalities will also change.

First of all, this is the Ministry of Economic Development, where Elena Murzina will leave her post by 99.99 percent. The Ministry of Construction, Infrastructure and Roads will definitely be divided, and the current minister will not remain. And, by the way, one of the options for Sergei Davydov is the transition to one of the new structures. For example, for road construction. After all, he has become skilled at this over the years of city management (smiles).

The Ministry of Industry will be transformed. If only because the Ministry of Industry is there only in its name - the structure deals mainly with issues of property, the issuance of licenses for deposits, and so on. And there clearly requires a clearer understanding of what it should be doing at all. As for the Ministry of Radiation and environmental safety, which does not understand what at all, like dumps, but has more than a hundred officials on its staff.

In general, you need to understand that the Government is, first of all, an instrument that is selected based on the goals of the work you are doing. If you hammer in nails, then it should be a hammer, if you look at bacteria, then a microscope, and not vice versa, and so on.

And in the case of the Cabinet of Ministers, if you want to understand exactly how it will be transformed, then you need to clearly understand what tasks Boris Dubrovsky is setting for himself, and whether he has a concept for their solution.

The concept is definitely there - its "STRATEGY-2020".

- This "strategy" is rather a kind of PR document, which is hardly worth considering seriously for professional people. I know that instructions have already been given to rewrite it, both to local and nonresident experts. If only because it is hardly possible now to set the task of doubling the GRP in the light of recent events in the politics and economy of Russia. These are rather pre-election things, and nothing more. And first you need to decide on a structure that will be sharpened for solving real problems (even if they are not declared publicly, which is bad in itself), and then on people.

Concern about the strategy, which Boris Dubrovsky expressed from the very beginning, is like a director who does not have a work plan: it is like death. Therefore, he wants to understand, understand, decide.

Therefore, a certain block of ministers and key vice-governors were reappointed outright, and the fuss with the "economic" structures of the government will continue for several more months. Although "Petridi incidents" are not excluded.

What do you have in mind? And what does Ivan Petridi have to do with it?

Will explain. On the one hand, the post of an advisor is somewhat free - you can listen to it, you can not listen to it. But on the other hand, the appointment to, in general, a public and high post associated with expert work, a person, shall we say, ambiguous from a reputation point of view.

I have nothing against Ivan Petridi personally. But the unfolding public scandal with the situation around the defrauded equity holders in the Prostory microdistrict and the Green Park firm, where Petridi was the director prior to his appointment as an advisor, does not add to the reputation of either the adviser or the governor himself.

Whether Boris Dubrovsky understands this or not, such incidents are political, they are signs, signals. And the repetition of this must be excluded. Because who Petridi is, you can forget at any moment in a month or two, but the fact that the very first scandal under Dubrovskoye is associated with defrauded equity holders and formally the closest member of his team will be remembered.

Municipalities are another headache. And the matter is not only in the constantly arising criminal cases, as in Chebarkul, Korkino or in Kyshtym (as far as I know, a case has already been initiated against Shebolaeva).

Take the situation in Chebarkul. There, in fact, now there is no de facto power at all. The disgraced head of the city of Orlov in Thailand is resting (according to the governor's media), his first deputy Safonov is being “knitted” in criminal cases. And at the same moment, the governor's special representative, Alexander Raevsky, was recalled from the city, who, it would seem, was sent there to restore order. That, in the city, everything is already so good, everything is adjusted and under control, that you can withdraw?

Interaction with municipalities is a thing that the previous head of the region, Mikhail Yurevich, somehow broke his teeth about. Take, for example, the eternally "rebellious" Miass, or Chrysostom, or "closed cities".

Not without it. And at the same time, this is a key issue, especially in the context of interbudgetary policy, when the region is forced to subsidize cities and districts, and the regional authorities simply do not have powers to control the “enraged” head in any way.

Relations with the heads must be built in any case. And build competently. Yes, of course, you can go by the method of pressure or in extreme cases, the initiation of criminal cases, good reason, alas, are given by many. But what does the power itself look like, its authority in the eyes of the inhabitants? Especially if the reason for these or those actions is some kind of entries in social networks (in any case, this is how it looks).

And all this is going on a knurled one, and not with the first governor - but what is the effect? In Ozersk, I remember, this did not give any result in the end - local deputies anyway, they themselves decided which Head of the city they should choose. Without looking back at individual representatives of the regional authorities and their "wishlist".

The fact that in Chebarkul, Korkino or Kyshtym residents will spit at their mayor will not increase either his effectiveness or the authority of the regional authorities.

In fact, there is a tool - these are elections. And if the mayor of the city is incompetent, then in the next elections, as practice shows, people are able to change this themselves. Trust some of that work political parties, opposition, let them criticize the heads, let them lead people to rallies, prepare public opinion. It will be okay!

And this method is politics, not political technologies (which in recent times too addicted, and which are completely unproductive). Strange ratings or something else dubious in news agencies with a reference to an "anonymous source in the government" - after all, this is not really politics. She has yet to return to our area (smiles).

There was a lot of noise in the local media yesterday Affairs initiated by the Investigation Department of the Sovetsky District of Chelyabinsk ICR against A. Nikitin's firm "Stroysvyazural 1" due to allegedly unpaid taxes: behind such media hype are usually large commercial disassembly; Nikitin himself sees here the interests of well-known businessmen-deputies of the Legislative Assembly from the United Russia Y. Karlikanov and K. Strukov, and the real reason for the conflict is Karlikanov's debt of hundreds of millions of rubles and the withdrawal of a multi-storey business center in Chelyabinsk Kirovka by Strukov.

We discussed this topic for quite a long time yesterday with Artur Nikitin, and this is what is emerging, if very briefly. Karlikanov's structures owe Nikitin's structures 490 million rubles (and another 170 million - to the tax service and 170 million - to the Chelyabinsk budget), many courts were held and Nikitin arrested almost all of Karlikanov's available property; Having made a deal for the sale of Karlikanov's business tower on Kirovka to K. Strukov, entrepreneurs transferred the ownership of this object to a Gibraltar offshore, leaving the region without tax revenues. However, for some reason, these sins are hidden from the watchful eye of the tax authorities and investigators of the Sovetsky district of Chelyabinsk. The conflict with Nikitin is very serious in its consequences for the United Russia deputy and he saw a chance to get away from claims for hundreds of millions of rubles, bankrupt his opponent's company through tax claims.

This is where the St. Petersburg firm "Stremberg", tax and insurance companies appear on the scene. Soviet district... The fact is that A. Nikitin's Stroisvyazural built in 2012 in St. Petersburg together with Stremberg the largest water park in Europe (170 thousand square meters) and Entertainment Center"Piterland" (money and the project were Nikitin, land - the owner of "Stremberg" A. Kozhin). However, the partners soon parted ways - the ownership of the center was fixed 50 to 50, but Kozhin did not pay Nikitin a ruble, renting out his share all these years and regularly earning multimillion-dollar profits from this. All these years the courts went on - Nikitin wins, having already sued Stremberg about 4 billion rubles in total; now he is very close to getting not half of Piterland, but the whole complex.

Kozhin, like Karlikanov, has the only chance of salvation is to take Nikitin out of the game, bankrupt Stroisvyazural and take over the management of this company. On this they agreed, and met with Kozhin K. Strukov, Karlikanov's partner.

As a result, a “case” appeared (immediately “leaked” in the media), which is based on the claim of tax authorities that Stroisvyazural allegedly did not pay taxes on the sale of part of the debt seized from Stremberg, which amounted to 1,200 million rubles. However, the truth is that Nikitin's firm did not receive any 1.2 billion from Stremberg: it was officially recognized that it was not possible to collect this debt (to the great regret of Nikitin's creditor), since the debtor firm has assets worth 1, 6 billion rubles with a debt of 9 billion- in addition, they are pledged by the offshore company of the owners of "Stremberg". That's why independent appraisal determined the real value of this debt at 11 million rubles, and Nikitin was able to realize it for 25 million - from which all taxes were paid.

That is no 1.2 billion, from which, according to the investigators of the Soviet district, taxes were not paid, Nikitin's company simply never had.
Even the investigator, according to the businessman, was surprised by the strange fact underlying the "accusation." It should be noted that this kind of "affairs", becoming public and known to the federal authorities of the law enforcement agencies, are strongly discouraged there today: all interested parties are well aware of this.

Everything that is briefly described here is rather complex business matters (behind the shoulders of Stroisvyazural and Stremberg there are 8 thousand (!) court hearings, there is all the documentary evidence), however, as usual, they are based on a tough commercial conflict over a lot of money. The main characters of this plot are public people, deputies of the Legislative Assembly of the region from United Russia Karlikanov and Strukov, while Karlikanov owed money, in every possible way avoiding fulfilling his multimillion-dollar obligations, to everyone who could only - from the city of Chelyabinsk to the Federal Tax Service - and this is also well known to all.

Our state structures often very sluggishly defend the interests of society where they are opposed by hardened businessmen who know how to find a common language with officials; however, Karlikanov and Strukov found a serious opponent in the person of Artur Nikitin: hence the intensity of the struggle and the size of the rates. So this story can end in a very interesting way, but in any case it promises to be very resonant.

What should be taken into account when assessing the political crisis in Chelyabinsk region, which broke out after the decision of the Federal Antimonopoly Service to initiate conspiracy cases in relation to the governor Dubrovsky, as well as a number of local officials and businessmen?

This situation wears irreversible, it is impossible to "wait out" or stop it, since the complex federal investigation In relation to the governor and his "team", all the key control and law enforcement agencies are now leading in different directions: the prosecutor's office, the police, the FSB, the FAS. The decision of the antimonopoly department of August 30 only brought this large-scale investigation into the public political plane.

Recall that the tough anti-corruption order of the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Ponomarev to the Regional Prosecutor Lopin (on facts not directly related to the claims of the FAS) was dated August 18, serious violations of the law by the governor's team and earlier; OFAS “victorious” contests for the Dubrovsky family have long been, and Deputy Minister Bakhayev, who is responsible for the preparation of the SCO summit, was detained by the FSB a month and a half ago.

The official materials of the FAS provide a formal basis for the adoption procedural decisions other power structures, and also prepare public opinion for fundamental personnel decisions. The investigation of the antimonopoly department cannot be terminated and will end with a specific decision (recall that the head of the FAS Artemyev is a member of a narrow circle of the leadership of the country's state bodies and would never have made a decision on a personal investigation against the head of a large region without having undeniable arguments in hand and without agreeing it in the political instance). And there is the "upper limit" of punishment - criminal article for up to 15 years. And even if there is no "criminal offense" against the governor, personal participation in the conspiracy is more than a sufficient reason for resignation (and such a scenario should be seen by Dubrovsky as extremely optimistic - according to our information, he is ready to leave even tomorrow, but hopes to bargain some "Honorable conditions").

In the second half of September, a new wave of high-profile investigations in the field of road repair is expected in the region, as well as, most likely, the work of the regional MHIF (it is well known that construction and repair of healthcare facilities in the region are also almost exclusively commercial structures related to the governor). At the same time, control and law enforcement will come to grips with the activities of the Chelyabinsk administration, headed by Dubrovsky's closest ally Teftelev (so his today's adage about the possible departure, "shift workers" and "shift workers" is not at all accidental: that's just not he will decide on the next head of the city).
The regional ONF, which has long criticized the socio-economic policy of the Dubrovsky government, also plans to intensify activities for public control of spending in the region. budget funds- some of the materials are already in the prosecutor's office.

Understanding how the work of a cumbersome and unwieldy state machine works, it would be extremely naive to believe that this entire massive campaign was started (at the time the issue of the next Chelyabinsk governor was resolved) “by accident” or was intended only to “shake a finger” at Dubrovsky.

It's obvious that it comes on the change of the ruling team in the region, which has compromised itself with incapacity, as well as regularly and openly violating anti-corruption laws - and even directly getting into the pockets of the population. This question has ripened for a long time, we have written about it here more than once. The fact that the "window" for the replacement of the Chelyabinsk governor opens after the completion of the September regional elections in the country was also emphasized by the Petersburg Politics Foundation, which named the region among the regions where replacement of heads is most likely; we believed that the most convenient moment for this was the period around the New Year.

However, it seems that the whole "puzzle" was formed earlier. Perhaps the adoption of the decision on Dubrovsky accelerated the center's awareness of the fact that the preparation of the SCO summit in the region has failed and only an urgent and high-quality renewal of the regional government, the arrival of people who you can trust budget money.

It should be understood that key personnel decisions do not have to be momentary. But they cannot be postponed "on the back burner", since the de facto legitimate government in the region no longer exists. Dubrovsky and his deputies have never been an authority either for business, or even for local officials and deputies (the situation in Miass and other cities of the region clearly confirms this). Now with the governor, who is under serious federal investigation, no one will talk about anything substantively at all.

The situation regarding the imminent replacement of the governor is made obvious by the complete lack of trust rating among Dubrovsky and his team on the part of Chelyabinsk residents (according to our data, federal agencies determine this rating at a level of no more than 5%).

It is pointless to speculate about the personalities of Dubrovsky's replacement, but it is known that the “lineup” of such people (both directly related to the Urals and working outside the region) has been formed a long time ago. Each of them is able to quickly accept the region and bring it out of the deep crisis in which the Chelyabinsk region finds itself now.

It is symbolic that on September 26, a verdict will be passed on the former vice-governor N. Sandakov, who was appointed by M. Yurevich and who worked for more than a year as B. Dubrovsky's deputy: now the investigators have new "heroes" from this administration. The investigation into the activities of the Chelyabinsk governors, which has been going on for a long time here in the regimenon - stop should finally serve as a solid lesson for the next applicants for this chair.

P . S . Moscow will certainly appreciate the ridiculous commentary of B. Dubrovsky, who was outraged by the fact that the federal department issued a ruling on his colluding, previously with him without discussing it in detail. And in general, all this "distracts him from the holidays": the governor predicted that he would be able to understand something in this decision "in three years."

Here, of course, only M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin will help with help: "There is no nonsense pot, like nonsense"... It is well known that it takes a disproportionate amount of time for Dubrovsky to understand simple things (for example: it is not good when the majority of large budget contracts are won by the firms of the governor's family members and their partners); however, there is very little doubt that after three years he will continue to comprehend what happened in a completely different place.

cartelization of road construction in the region for the benefit of specific commercial groups.

This cannot but follow the question of political credibility the head of the region, accused of such a serious violation of the law. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the FAS (and not only this department) has other stories about competitions for many hundreds of budget millions, which were constantly won by firms associated with Governor Dubrovsky or directly owned by members of his family.
In Chelyabinsk, the next governor-businessman has long been spoken of contemptuously on every corner, and therefore any decisions of the federal authorities will be perceived here, as they say, "with full understanding."

The scandal surrounding the persecution by local bureaucratic clans of the director of the famous Chelyabinsk Physics and Mathematics Lyceum N31, Alexander Popov, reached the federal and international levels, in fact, turning into a political one. Whether its participants wanted it or not. Sincerely not wanting such a development of events, I refrained from commenting on this topic for a long time.

On Friday 13 September, immediately after Popov was charged with attempted bribery and fraud http://news.mail.ru/inregions/ural/74/incident/14752964/?frommail=1, the organizers and participants ( Maxim Karpov and his colleagues) of the international taekwondo tournament, ending today in Chelyabinsk - among them were Popov's eminent students. For the second week, a film crew of the NTV channel has been working in the city, preparing an unusually detailed story about the "teacher's case" for the program "Profession - reporter". Federal media have addressed this topic more than once or twice and continue to monitor it.
http://www.aif.ru/society/article/66777, http://rusrep.ru/article/2013/09/11/oldboy
http://svpressa.ru/society/article/73054/, http://shtab31.livejournal.com/36938.html
etc.

Today, dozens of very famous people were involved in the Popov case - from writers Prilepin http://svpressa.ru/blogs/article/72677/, Shargunov and Bykov (by the way, they will soon be in Chelyabinsk) to producer Kandelaki and Governor Yurevich http://chelyabinsk.ru/text/newsline/690682.html (Vice-Governor Sandakov spoke with NTV journalists, just in case). The high-profile "case" is being closely watched in Moscow.

No other topic is now heard at the federal level in connection with the Chelyabinsk region as clearly as this one. It is understandable why it has acquired such a public outcry, but the time has come to formulate these reasons more clearly.

The country is now frozen for a brief moment at the bifurcation point, waiting for a signal. Where to go? Down, into the traditional and senseless "tightening the belts" and "tightening the screws" - or up, pulling up to the existing piece models of the post-industrial "knowledge economy" together with the civilized world? The Popov Lyceum, one of the best in the country, is a symbol of the second path. The director’s verdict on the “corruption case” that was sucked out of the finger will become a sign that the authorities have suicidal chosen the first one.

In the Chelyabinsk region, there is no more striking achievement of the "knowledge industry" than the physics and mathematics lyceum created by Popov (SURGU was not even included in the top 100 universities of the Russian Federation, and the 31st lyceum is the third among the best). Young investigators, abandoned by police chiefs to shake up the papers of the lyceum, the families of students and Popov's employees in search of the director's greed, were amazed to find that this "corrupt official" lives very modestly with his wife in a two-room apartment on the first floor of a panel five-story building, and he did not take money out of the lyceum , and brought them there - personally earned.

You can argue a lot about the legal nuances of this case (although from the very the fact of a bribe the prosecution has already refused, it is also confirmed that Popov agreed to take the money for the needs of the school). But, in the end, it looks like this: all the forces of the state are thrown here not to encourage, but to destroy the first and, possibly, the last real achievements of the modern "knowledge economy" in the stagnating old industrial Chelyabinsk region; the fight against corruption is profaned in the most shameful and destructive way for society.

They argue that it is necessary to punish the director's desire to accept from the persistent ( suspiciously persistent: this was understood in hindsight) of the applicant 25 thousand rubles, which were needed to finance the trip of the accompanying student to the Olympiad in Vladivostok. At the same time, in front of everyone's eyes, hundreds of millions of budget rubles are plundered with impunity through insane spending on endless and stupid repairs of the same road sections, numerous tenders for the supply of expensive and unnecessary equipment, the purchase and operation of luxury cars and utensils for officials, new luxurious office space , "Renovation" and "modernization" of hospitals (which turn into good-quality painting of the walls), multibillion-dollar budgetary investments in private business selected merchants and the like.

But the main and perhaps the only corrupt official in the region who deserves a trial is the school director Popov, who did not steal a single penny of state money!

The persecution of the mathematician Popov is a sign that the power represented by the bureaucratic clans in the region is shifting to open suppression of not even political opponents and commercial competitors. She calls her enemy a completely non-politicized humanitarian community (those very qualified "doctors and teachers" whose political apathy has long served as her support), blaming him professional independence and unforgiving ability for moral assessments. Too many people in Chelyabinsk and outside it are actively against this rude pressure - there are more and more of them http://shtab31.livejournal.com/, http://slo-vo.ru/obshchestvo/delo-popova, http: // www .kp.ru / daily / 26125/3017491 /.

On the sidelines, they are now talking a lot about versions and background: that the police did not forgive Popov for his emotional reaction to the demand to report the nationality of his students http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/52788.html, that the history shows the interests of the ascended by the power of the teacher I. Iogolevich and his influential brother - the general of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the long-standing friendship of the ex - vice - governor A. Ufimtsev with the physical instructor Puzyrev, who received a symbolic slap in the face from Popov (this shameful "case" is also in court http://bkjournal.org/ poshchechina-ot-poetov /); that there was a banal provocation of a bribe in order to vacate the chair of the director of the lyceum, and so on. These and other versions, each of which separately costs nothing, together denote the critical mass of the reaction, which is quite capable of giving rise to this monstrous "case" in its absurdity and social harm http://chelyabinsk.ru/text/person/689410.html?first

Now one thing is clear: anyone who sits in the director's chair of the 31st Lyceum after thus displaced Popov, will be doomed for a very long time to prove to everyone that he is not a scoundrel. And it will not be easy for him to do it.

The participants in the conflict have nowhere to retreat - the epaulettes of some and the human, professional reputation of others are at stake. The trial, which will begin, apparently, in late autumn and will fall on the hot political season, promises to be the most public, significant event for the country. At the same time, he will either finally bury the reputation of the Chelyabinsk region, or force people to speak of it with respect. For the first time in a long time - without mentioning "harsh metallurgists", "red cowards", environmental disasters, corrupt officials and "flying pasta monsters".

https: //www.site/2017-06-09/politolog_aleksandr_podoprigora_o_tom_kogda_i_pochemu_smenitsya_vlast_v_chelyabinskoy_oblasti

“Other people will just come. This is inevitable, because it is logical "

Political scientist Alexander Podoprigora - about when and why the power in the Chelyabinsk region will change

Yaroslav Naumkov

Political scientist and publicist, senior researcher at the Scientific and Educational Center of the Institute of Economics of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Chelyabinsk State University, Alexander Podoprigora does not consider himself a "networked" person. And indeed, apart from the diary in LiveJournal, which he started at the end of the 2000s and which he has not abandoned until now, he has no accounts in any of the social networks... He is very selective in his consumption of the products of the media agenda, on own experience making sure that the TV forgotten in the corner won't do modern man less informed. But it will give you the opportunity to tidy up your head and more soberly perceive the world around you.

- Alexander Vasilyevich, your rather critical position is known both to the "late" Sumin, and to Mikhail Yurevich, who replaced him for less than four years, and to the current governor Boris Dubrovsky. Sometimes we hear that the Chelyabinsk region is fatally unlucky with the leaders. Are you ready to agree with this?

“There is no fatality here, no“ curse ”. It’s just that political mistakes were made in due time. If Governor Sumin and his team had taken care of political continuity in time and carried out the appropriate work, then the "Yurevich incident" simply would not have taken place. As well as many other things.

"There will be organizational conclusions." Dubrovsky commented on the failure of his economic bloc

Because when in 2014 it was necessary to urgently remove Yurevich, it turned out that the region has the only system-forming structure that can "pick up" the situation and take responsibility for ensuring that everything here simply does not collapse overnight. This is MMK.

And of course, there were subjective factors, how can we go without them? But Dubrovsky is not a politician or a governor in essence, in terms of biography, training, mentality. It was a situational decision, he was given a chance. And there are quite countable results of his work - in all areas. All this will determine the arrival of a new person who will be picked up by Moscow in a much calmer environment.

- Now, in connection with your forecast, you will be accused of “working for the oligarchs” ...

- The "oligarchs" have nothing against Dubrovsky, and he himself did not "come out of the people" here at all ... And I am not saying that the governor will leave any day. But, I repeat, although there were great hopes, now everything became more or less clear with him. There are people who can replace him, and the change of power is a normal process.

- Would you like to say that in three years, in addition to MMK, other “backbone structures” have appeared in the region?

- The general situation is not much, but it has changed. Politics in general is a very lively, changeable business, it is not true that somewhere there is an "insider" that you just need to cunningly learn and everything will become clear - how and what will happen. But what was a real scenario yesterday may change dramatically today under the influence of a variety of factors that no one thought to take into account yesterday. Which, perhaps, were simply not there yesterday. And no one, at any level, believe me, knows for certain “how it will be” in six months.

I may be wrong, but as I understand it, MMK may soon change its status, becoming part of a large federal holding. This is an objective process, all other large enterprises have already gone through it.

Accordingly, the role of the company in the region is changing. Has anyone heard, for example, that Mechel or Fortum is actively involved in regional politics? It is not interesting for them, it is not necessary, it would even be harmful. The same will happen here. Viktor Rashnikov, as the owner of a particular plant, is genetically closely related to the regional administration (and he was much more connected with Khristenko and Sumin than today with Dubrovsky) - this is one thing. The division of the federal holding in Magnitogorsk is completely different. Until the process is completed, Dubrovsky is needed here. But it is close to completion, it seems to me.

- And who then?

- Let's not guess. I will only say that the region today is unattractive for serious groups of influence, so there will be no particular struggle for the governor's office: there is no significant money here, development resources are limited, and it is difficult to make a career here. Still, there are such interests. These are the groups that control the surviving remnants of the Chelyabinsk mechanical engineering (primarily Rostec), as well as mining corporations. The centers of these interest groups are Moscow and Yekaterinburg. This is where we must proceed. And I think this is a reason for optimism - it is always better to "fasten" on federal locomotives than on peripheral leaders. There is a good understanding of the situation, serious resources and interest in the long-term prospects of work in the region, and not in these fairy tales about the SCM and the SCO.

- Will the Chelyabinsk region "fasten" itself to Yekaterinburg? Evgeny Roizman once called Kaslinsky casting a Yekaterinburg brand, which caused righteous anger among the Chelyabinsk public. Do you understand how many people now have you provoked indignation with your words?

- The "area" is a phantom. People live in cities and villages, not in regions. There was a time when the Chelyabinsk region was not, but people always lived in Chelyabinsk, Zlatoust, Troitsk and did not feel deprived of something. You can be proud of your ancient or, conversely, modern city, but not the administrative borders on the map, which were drawn by Stalin or redrawn by Khrushchev.

If tomorrow this or that region unites with another, it will not be a tragedy for anyone except regional officials, many of whom will be unnecessary.

I wrote about this in my book - new cultural and economic regions have long been formed in the country (by the way, the research group was the first to confirm this fact at the beginning of the 2000s, working on behalf of Sergei Kiriyenko, then the presidential envoy in Volga federal district), which actually exist across the borders of the "Soviet" regions. They unite territories with a common history, culture, mentality of people, demography, economic structure, and so on.

One can argue about different regions of the Urals, but the fact that such a rather homogeneous region is the Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk and Kurgan region, obviously. And the leadership of Yekaterinburg is beyond doubt. I often visit Yekaterinburg for work and not only. The main feeling from comparison with Chelyabinsk is that the dynamics and scale of the capital city are very strongly felt there. In everything, from new construction to cultural, intellectual life. For example, at the end of June, the Yeltsin Center will host a large scientific symposium on the problem of cyclical development of Russia, I was invited to make a report there. It is simply impossible for me to imagine a discussion of this kind of topic in Chelyabinsk.

We are very pretentious, at the governor's level, discussing the construction of a vegetable store. This is the scale of the agenda, opportunities, ambitions ...

But this is understandable - today's Chelyabinsk was born as an agglomeration of workers' settlements, and the industry of the last century is dying. Therefore, the inclusion of a more powerful modern center in the orbit is inevitable and generally positive. Already 10 years ago, I saw maps of the development strategy of Yekaterinburg, where, for example, Ozersk was included in the 100-kilometer zone of "Big Yekaterinburg". And Ufaley there, and Snezhinsk ...

- Then you should welcome the construction of the Chelyabinsk - Yekaterinburg high-speed railroad, and you all criticize it ...

- I'm not at all against the highway as such. If tomorrow some powerful private investor comes here and says: I will build you a high-speed railroad, I know how to make money on it - a flag in hand. Although, of course, one must understand that any improvement in transport connectivity between these cities will mean in today's conditions an acceleration of the outflow of people and money to Yekaterinburg and, accordingly, the degradation of Chelyabinsk. But there is no such investor in nature, which is significant. And when we are offered to build and then operate high-speed railways in one way or another at the expense of budgets, pension and insurance funds (as if this money has no more pressing use) - excuse me. Everything is extremely simple here: you have very little money and you are offered to buy a terribly expensive thing that you do not need. Buy?

- Unlikely. So we still have to wait for the consolidation of regions within the boundaries of the Ural Federal District? Or the Chelyabinsk governor from Yekaterinburg?

- There is no need to change administrative boundaries now - we live in a global world where they are of very little importance: now completely different forces, tools and arguments are working. And the governor does not necessarily have to have a certain "registration", gender and age. However, let's not guess - it's more interesting this way, isn't it?

- I will specify already the question asked... In political circles, the name of Sergei Nosov, the current head of Nizhny Tagil, but a native of the Chelyabinsk region, is being actively discussed ...

- It's just an indicator. It's not about a specific surname.

The bottom line is that the Chelyabinsk post-Soviet "elite" failed as a whole, could not stand the competition. In its mass it turned out to be petty, poorly trained, provincial selfish.

For them, "politics" is a redistribution of illegal parking lots and transportation, lobbying for personal business. And the "Magnitogorsk experiment" did not solve this problem. At the same time, the challenges are growing. Therefore, other people will simply come, better educated, with social and political experience, a good outlook. This is inevitable simply because it is logical.

- Now there is a lot of talk about the development of a new strategy for the region until 2035. You seem to be pretty skeptical about that too? Why?

Dubrovsky selected 45 people to the regional strategic committee

- Strategies are needed, but there is a fundamental point here. All our "strategies" are not viable because they are invented by officials. Even if individual scientists are involved in this business "on a voluntary basis" local authorities set all the basic parameters and goals, determine the format and content of these papers. For them, this is a kind of "report" to their superiors.

But the main part of such work is an adequate analysis and assessment of the basic situation: what do we really have, what are the real resources, trends, chances and risks? Without this, nothing can be predicted, all these plans will be another "PR-shell".

But officials are not interested in a sober assessment - they perceive it as something that someone “gives a bad mark” to their work, they will read it in Moscow and they will be fired. Therefore, the only correct "strategy", in their firm conviction, is that everything is good, but it will be even better. But this is a profanity, serious experts will not subscribe to this.

- And what do you suggest?

- The analysis of the situation and the development of strategies should be undertaken by the society itself. We see an example of this at the federal level - this is, of course, the government, but the main stake is placed on the expert groups of Alexei Kudrin and the Stolypin club, and business finances the work.

If in our country, say, a regional SPP or a group of corporations took over the organizational function and entrusted this matter to scientists and experts, we would get an alternative scenario based on a reliable assessment of the state of affairs. But this is not done for the reasons I have already mentioned.

Therefore, we will get the next fantasies about the development in our country someday, in 2035, of “innovative technologies of the twenty-fifth order,” which will come running from no one knows where, and this Talmud will follow its predecessors onto the shelf. But what is much worse is that real opportunities, and the region certainly has them, can be missed.

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The fact that the plans of the authorities of the Chelyabinsk region (apparently, he is well acquainted with them) does not include an early election of a new "full-fledged" mayor of Chelyabinsk. You cannot wait with the competition for the election of the head until spring - to lead the city in a difficult winter should be the mayor, not an interim representative, said the plenipotentiary at a meeting with the chairmen of the parliaments of the Ural regions. The chairman of the Legislative Assembly V. Myakush immediately (at least in words) "saluted".

The fact that the dissatisfaction of the federal authorities with the Chelyabinsk political games was brought to the public plane for such high level, very revealing. Let's try to figure out what this "message" of the plenipotentiary envoy to the Chelyabinsk governor means.

It is no coincidence that the administration of B. Dubrovsky is not in a hurry with the procedure for electing a new mayor of the regional capital and would like to keep V. Elistratov in this post as the "interim" head of the city for as long as possible (that is, approximately until May, which is allowed by the Charter of the city and local legislation) ... That's why.

First, the “Magnitogorsk team” simply does not have a “passable” candidate who meets the relevant requirements, who would be approved by Moscow and for whom the Chelyabinsk deputies would vote. The Miass scenario is a nightmare of Dubrovsky and Golitsyn, and its repetition in Chelyabinsk is now more than possible. This would be the final cross on political career the governor and all his entourage - and a career not only political and not only in Chelyabinsk.

The city elites are awaiting the resignation of the governor and will not argue anyhow what his protégé will not be: there is now a vast field for bargaining and strong local candidates. But whoever was elected as the new head, this person (even if the same Elistratov becomes him), having established himself in his post, having received the support of the city clans and Moscow, will no longer be an obedient executor of Dubrovsky's will during the period while the latter remains governor. He, of course, will focus on much more reliable forces - local elites, federal authorities and the population: the position of the mayor will be many times stronger than the governor's. In this case, Dubrovsky loses the city completely, and with it - the last, most illusory hopes of getting a chance to participate in the elections.

In addition, as it has been reliably found out, the regional authorities simply do not have real levers of influence on authoritative mayors. The law enforcement agencies do not obey them (now the situation is rather the opposite), and no one will play budget transfers for political purposes: the regional finance minister would rather resign than refuse planned transfers to one city or another for heat, housing and communal services or crops only because that the governor wants to "punish" the mayor. The head of the region can stomp his foot and swear in the media as much as he wants, but in fact there is no “vertical of power” in the regions. And what political methods of leadership are, Dubrovsky has long forgotten, and he hardly ever knew.


His administration is now living on the principle of "stand day and night hold out": the resignation of an extremely unpopular governor, on whom Moscow simply can not make a bet on the 2019 elections (especially in light of the course and results of the current election campaigns in other regions), with a 99% probability it is possible any minute, critical dates are here: November - early December 2018, January 2019 and, the deadline is April 2019 (six months before the elections).

Therefore, it is beneficial for Dubrovsky, regardless of how and when his "personal question" is resolved, to have all this time at the head of Chelyabinsk, not a full-fledged and independent mayor, but "suspended" in an uncertain status, dependent on him and Teftelev "interim" will help them complete many important personal projects here (it is no coincidence that Teftelev will deal with property issues in the regional government, he did exactly the same in the city of Elistratov - this is a very effective tandem in its own way). That is, it is in the interests of the governor to delay the election of the mayor as much as possible: if everything goes well for him - just until spring, until he leaves.

But this is categorically unacceptable for the federal government, whose position was voiced yesterday by Tsukanov. With a weak governor who does not enjoy the trust of the population and the support of the elites, who is on the verge of resignation (the plenipotentiary knows this better than ours), it is important for the center to have at least one political "foothold" in the region on the eve of an important election campaign difficult, and the socio-political situation in Chelyabinsk is very difficult).

Moscow clearly does not intend to lose another "millionaire" because of Dubrovsky's incapacity and for the sake of his personal plans. That's why federal authorities we need a full-fledged, influential and responsible mayor of the city (and not “Dubrovsky's man” at all) as soon as possible. What such people No- the myth of the governor's political strategists, it is enough offhand to name the names of Ovchinnikov, Mosharov, Kotova, Vyatkin or Baryshev, there are still several completely real candidates well known to Moscow; however, this is a separate topic.

That is why Plenipotentiary Representative Tsukanov was harsh and frank yesterday. The situation around the election of a new mayor of Chelyabinsk is becoming politically key for the region and we will closely monitor it here. Today one thing is clear: this agenda has become yet another - perhaps the decisive and last "zone of conflict" between federal center and the administration of Dubrovsky. For the time being, the head of the region no longer has good moves in this difficult game.